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Carlucci: Litigation Funding Devices for Franchisees: Are They Securities?

NOTE
LITIGATION FUNDING DEVICES FOR
FRANCHISEES: ARE THEY SECURITIES?
I. INTRODUCTION
Commentators have characterized the 1990s as "the decade of
'franchisee empowerment."" This describes the movement among
franchisees to gain bargaining power over their franchisors.2 For
decades, franchisees signed adhesion contracts,3 accepting that they had
far less economic resources and negotiating expertise than their wealthy
franchisors.4 They collected their life savings and agreed to well-drafted
franchise contracts in hopes of achieving the dreams of owning their own
businesses--unaware of the amount of ownership and control the
franchisors would retain.' In the late 1970s, in response to a growing
number of complaints from franchisees, legislatures enacted various laws6
to protect the franchisees' interests against unfair trade practices.
However, these statutes only addressed general provisions and disclosure

1. Erik B. Wulff, Actions by Franchisee Associations: Antitrust and Other Legal
Complicationsfor Franchisorsand Franchisees, 13 FRANCHISE L.J. 57, 57 (1993).
2. See id. at 59-60 (discussing the role of adversarial franchisee associations which attempt
to balance bargaining power with their franchisors through actions such as collectively renegotiating
their franchise agreements and instituting litigation against their franchisors).
3. See Dennis D. Palmer, Franchises: Statutory and Common Law Causes of Action in
Missouri Revisited, 62 UMKC L. REv. 471, 518 (1994) (noting franchisors' use of "standard
practices, procedures, and forms" in their relations with franchisees).
4. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchisingand the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REv. 927, 960-63 (1990) (explaining how the combination of the
franchisor's use of standard form contracts and the general lack of business experience on the part
of franchisees creates the typical reliance relationship that can be found among franchisors and franchisees).
5. See id. at 959 (describing franchisors' campaigns to attract franchisees by advertising that
the franchisees can own their own business and enjoy a sense of independence with minimal risk).
6. See Lawrence I. Fox, State Franchise,and DealerProtectionLaws, in DISTRIBUTION AND
MARKETING: THE NEW ANTITRUST ENVIRONMENT 377, 386, 409-10 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 511, 1986) (listing a number of federal and state statutes enacted by
the legislature to protect franchisees including, but not limited to, the Lanham Act, the FTC Act,
RICO, the Delaware Franchise Security Law, and the Indiana Deceptive Franchise Practices Law).
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requirements,7 leaving the franchisees' sole recourse for specific disputes
in the court system. But due process is often expensive, and many
franchisees found that they could not afford to bring suit or to remain in
litigation with a wealthier franchisor for an extended period of time.8
This Note analyzes three funding devices whereby franchisees, who
generally cannot afford the financial cost of protracted litigation against
their franchisor, can balance the economic playing field and finance their
day in court. The three franchisee litigation funding devices are: class
action suits, litigation trust agreements, and investor-financed lawsuits.
Each device is described in detail below. As Part II of this Note
demonstrates, the devices not only provide adequate funding to finance
lawsuits against franchisors, but they often have the potential to generate
profits for the participating franchisees. The Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") is often suspicious of devices which unite
individuals for the purpose of generating a profit, for fear that such
devices will mislead an uninformed public. Therefore, it must be
determined whether the SEC will classify these three devices as
securities, under the federal securities acts, and regulate them accordingly. To determine if these devices will be characterized as securities, Part
III perfornis a securities analysis using the "Howey Test ' 9 and reviews
possible securities law exemptions. If such a classification is made,
franchisees will be subject to strict disclosure and registration requirements. Such requirements could prove burdensome to the franchisees,
causing them to seek refuge in securities law exemptions or possibly
frustrating the very purpose of these devices.
I.

GAINING ECONOMIC POWER

A.

Class Action

Class actions are often thought of as economically efficient
devices"° for prosecuting common claims of many individuals who

7. See id.at 409-82 (detailing various state franchise statutes which were directed at
disclosure, termination, notice, renewal, and standards of conduct in franchise agreements).
8. See Ellen R. Lokker, The Use of Litigation Trusts to Fund Franchisee Lawsuits, 14
FRANCHISE LJ.59, 59 (1995).
9. See SEC v. W. J.Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-301 (1946).
10. Class action suits are an economically efficient means to litigate because when a class
action suit, as opposed to many individual suits, is filed, the cost of filing fees, discovery, and other
litigation procedures is lowered. With a class action, each procedure only needs to be performed
once for the entire class. See Paula Batt Wilson, Note, Attorney Investment in Class Action
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would not be able to bring individual suits because of a lack of financial
resources." Not surprisingly, some franchisees and commentators of
franchise relationships have turned to class actions as a method whereby
franchisees of the same franchise can collectively sue their franchisor. 2
When franchisees from different states unite to commence a lawsuit
against their franchisor or when franchisees of the same state raise a
federal cause of action against their franchisor, 3 such actions will be
governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4
1. Requirements under Federal Rule 23

To maintain a class action in federal court under Rule 23, a plaintiff
must satisfy the following requirements: (a) joinder must be impracticable due to the large number of members in the class; (b) common

questions of law and fact must exist; (c) representative parties' claims or
defenses must be typical of those of the class; and (d) representative
5
parties must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.'
Each requirement of Rule 23 has given rise to a substantial body of
interpretive case law. For example, in determining whether joinder is
impracticable, courts look to several factors including: (i) size of the
class; (ii) ease of identifying members and determining their location;
(iii) geographical distribution of members; (iv) size of the individual
claims; and (v) the ability of class members to institute individual
claims.' 6 Additionally, with regard to commonality, although courts

Litigation:The Agent Orange Example, 45 CASE NV.RFs. L. REv. 291, 299-300 (1994) (discussing
how the aggregate costs of individual suits are often too burdensome for individuals to raise and how
the class action suit can provide class members access to the courts).
11. See Palmer, supra note 3, at 518; see also JEROLD S. SOLOVY Er AL., CLASS ACTION
CONTRoVERSES 1, 3 (1991).
12. See In re International House of Pancakes Franchise Litig., 78 F.R.D. 379, 380 (W.D. Mo.
1978) (discussing current and former franchisees who brought a class action suit against their
franchisor, claiming an illegal "tying" arrangement); Robert W. Emerson, Franchisingand the
Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1503, 1532-34 (1990). Emerson claims that
successful class actions are more likely to lead to substantial systematic changes in a franchise
relationship than individual lawsuits, but notes that the "ultimate effects of... class action[s] are
unpredictable." Id. at 1533. See also Palmer, supra note 3, at 518-19 (describing the requirements
a franchisee must meet to initiate a class action suit against its franchisor).
13. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332 (1994).
14. FED. R. Crv. P. 23.
15. See id. 23(a).
16. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the basic question
is practicability of joinder, which depends on the size of the class, ease of identifying members,
determining their addresses and making service on them, and their geographic dispersion, and not
number of interested persons per se); see also Tenants Associated for a Better Spaulding v. United
States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 97 F.R.D. 726 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding that there is no
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disagree as to whether individual class members must have more than
one question of law or fact in common, 17 they agree that all claims
raised by the members do not have to be identical. 8 Factual variations
in the claims may exist, so long as the claims arise out of the same legal
theory." Furthermore, for the representative parties' claims and defenses
to be "typical," they must "stem from the same event ... that forms the
basis of the claims" and must be based on the same legal theory as the
claims and defenses of the members of the class.2 ° Finally, courts find
the fourth requirement satisfied when "the representative [has] common
interests with the unnamed members of the class" and it "appearEs] that
the representative will vigorously prosecute the interests of the class
through qualified counsel."'
Certain groups of franchisees can easily qualify for class certification when raising common claims against their franchisor. For example,
franchisees associated with national franchises may satisfy the requirement for numerosity because, although the franchisees are easily
identifiable, their geographic distribution, as well as their limited
resources to bring individual claims, make it economically efficiene2 for
both the judicial system and the franchisees to try the claims together.
Additionally, because of franchisors' use of standard practices, contracts,
and procedures, 23 franchisees will often have more than one common
question of law and fact to raise a class action. Where commonality is

magic number of class members required; rather the court must consider a number of factors
including the ability of the individuals to raise separate suits); Jerold S. Solovy et al., Class Action
Controversies,in 2 CURRENT PROBLEMS IN CIVIL PRACTICE 1994, at 7, 15 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-499, 1994).
17. See Stewart v. Winter, 669 F.2d 328, 335 n.16 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that by the use of
the word "questions," more than one common question is required); Sanders v. Robinson
Humphrey/Am. Express, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1048, 1056 (N.D. Ga. 1986); cf Rolex Employees
Retirement Trust v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 136 F.R.D. 658, 662-63 (D. Or. 1991); Meiresonne v.

Marriott Corp., 124 F.R.D. 619, 622 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that commonality only requires the
existence of "at least one" common issue of fact or law); Armstrong v. Chicago Park Dist., 117
F.R.D. 623, 628 (N.D. Il1. 1987).
18. See Stewart, 669 F.2d at 335.
19. See Donaldson v. Pillsbury Co., 554 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1977).
20. Rolex, 136 F.R.D. at 663.

21. Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding inadequate representation
where the representative failed to appeal an adverse judgment against the class); see also Epstein v.
Weiss, 50 F.R.D. 387, 392 (E.D. La. 1970) (finding class representatives to have satisfied the fourth
requirement because of the identical interests of the representatives and the members of their class,
as well as the counsel's vigorous pursuit of the rights of the class members from the start of the

litigation).
22. See supra text accompanying note 4.
23. See supra note 3.
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achieved between the individual franchisee members of the class because
of similar experiences with their franchisor's business policies, it should
not be difficult to choose a representative among them who shares a
typical claim. Finally, once commonality and typicality are satisfied, the
requirement of fair and adequate representation can be easily satisfied so
long as the representative franchisee is dedicated to the litigation and the
welfare of the class.
2. Funding a Class Action
While satisfying the requirements for class certification may not
prove difficult for many groups of franchisees, funding the class action
may present a problem. There are three methods for funding a class
action lawsuit: the class representative can fund the suit, the class
representative and the class members can pool their money to fund the
suit, or the class attorney can agree to a contingency arrangement.24
As a general rule, because class representatives are plaintiffs to the
action, they are responsible for assuming "certain" costs and liabilities
associated with conducting a class action." Alternatively, class representatives may choose to fund the entire litigation.26 Class actions in
which the class representative pays for the entire litigation against the
franchisor are ideal for franchisees who have limited resources and
cannot afford to contribute to the action.
Where the class representative chooses to fund only part of the
lawsuit, the class members (all franchisees with common questions of
law or fact who are not named parties to the suit) may contribute the
remaining funds.27 The class representative may solicit funds from the
class members to finance the lawsuit. Such solicitation of funds will not
disqualify the representative party or automatically deny certification of
the class under Rule 23.28 It should be noted, however, that contribution
24. See Norris v. Colonial Commercial Corp., 77 F.R.D. 672, 673 (S.D. Ohio 1977); Solovy
et al., supra note 16, at 53-58.
25. Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 54.
26. See Norris, 77 F.R.D. at 673.

27. See id.
28. See id. (upholding a class' certification following a request by the class representative for
contribution to the funding of the lawsuit by stating that such an act did not reveal that the
representative could not '"fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,"' as required under

FED. R. Civ. P. 23). Some jurisdictions maintain very strict requirements for solicitation of funds
from class members by requiring advance approval from the court prior to both the solicitation and
withdrawal of funds. Even with such approval, funds can then only be used to pay litigation
expenses, excluding attorney fees. Additionally, these jurisdictions often require the class
representative to "clearly advise [class members] that [they] are not obligated to contribute, and that
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is not required to be a class member.29 Such an arrangement may be
beneficial to franchisees because those who want to contribute will find
that the costs are a fraction of what they would have been if they had
brought the litigation individually.
Alternatively, franchisees may fund their class litigation by entering
into a contingency arrangement with their attorney.30 Attorneys may be
more inclined to accept a franchisee's case on a contingency fee basis
when it is a class action suit, as opposed to an individual franchisee's
suit, because the potential profit from a class action is greater than from
an individual action.3'
A contingency arrangement is useful to franchisees because, in the
event of a successful verdict or settlement, the attorney receives a predetermined percentage of the judgment or settlement in addition to
expenses. 2 In the event the franchisees lose, the class members are not
responsible for attorney fees. While this arrangement lessens the amount
of recovery collected by the franchisees, it provides them access to the
court system without which there would be no recovery.
B. Litigation Trust Agreement
Franchisees who cannot satisfy the requirements under Rule 23 (for
example, because of their close geographic distribution or a small class
size) may use an alternative funding device called a litigation trust
agreement to finance their cause of action. The novel structure of a
litigation trust agreement creates a device that is different than a
traditional litigation trust. With a traditional litigation trust a trustee
manages a single cause of action for the benefit of respective beneficiaries.33 With a litigation trust agreement the trust is structured simply as
a funding device and the trustee does not manage the litigation but only
funds the litigation. Additionally, the new litigation trust agreements are

rights of recovery [are] the same for contributors and noncontributors." Norris, 77 F.R.D. at 673.
29. See id.
30. See Solovy et al., supra note 16, at 54.
31. See Wilson, supra note 10, at 298-99.
32. This method of calculating the attorney's contingency fee is known as the "percentage of
recovery method." See id. at 306. An alternative method is the "lodestar method" where the court
multiplies the reasonable number of hours the attorney worked on the case by the attorney's
reasonable hourly fee to "create an objective 'lodestar."' Courts may then adjust the "lodestar"
depending on various factors, including "high-risk litigation." See id. at 305-06.
33. See Lokker, supra note 8, at 60.
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created to fund more than one cause of action3 4 and therefore, typically
do not terminate at the end of the litigation.35 Furthermore, unlike

traditional
trusts, litigation trusts may not be the real party to the
36
lawsuit.

Because they are such a novel arrangement, litigation trust
agreements are rarely found in the franchise industry. However, such
trusts have recently been employed in three separate disputes involving
Mail Boxes Etc., Phar-Mor, Inc., and Pritchard Engineering and
Operating, Inc.37 While these disputes are but three examples, they
provide an interesting starting point for examination.

1. Provisions in a Litigation Trust Agreement
Although specific provisions in litigation trust agreements vary,
(based upon the aforementioned litigation trust agreements) the following
are examples of provisions franchisees may want to include in their
agreement.
Franchisee litigation trust agreements may state their purpose as
representing the interests of the franchisees in the negotiation, arbitration,

litigation, or settlement of common complaints or disputes against their
franchisor," with "no objective [of] conduct[ing] a trade or busi39
ness."

34. See id. at 59; see also Mailbox Franchisee Legal Trust: Declaration of Trust Indenture &
Adoption Agreement, art. 1 (Nov. 1, 1993) [hereinafter Mail Boxes Trust] (on file with author)
(representing a litigation trust agreement between franchisees of a national franchise). "Th[e] [Mail
Boxes] Trust is established for the exclusive purpose of representing the interests of Participants in
the Trust in the negotiation, arbitration, litigation, or settlement of the common claims or disputes
against Mail Boxes... "' Id.
35. See Mail Boxes Trust, supranote 34, § 7.02 ("This Trust shall terminate on or before the
year 2025 unless terminated sooner.").
36. See Lokker, supra note 8, at 59.
37. See Mail Boxes Trust, supra note 34; Phar-Mor, Inc.: Members Agreement of P-M
Litigation, L.L.C. Members Agreement (1995) [hereinafter Phar-Mor Trust] (on file with author)
(representing a franchisor litigation trust agreement for a national drug store franchise); B. J.
Tanenbaum, Jr. and Thomas H. Chmielewski, SEC No-Action Letter, Dec. 4, 1986, available in
LEXIS, Fedsee Library, No-Act. File [hereinafter Pritchard Trust Letter] (including a letter from Ted
N. Drake, the attorney who established the Pritchard Litigation Fund, to the SEC detailing a
proposed litigation trust agreement by a number of investors of oil and gas wells who sought to sue
a drilling company they employed). At the time the no-action letter was written, the investors had
not yet filed an action against Pritchard Engineering and Operating, Inc. The investors explained that
they were waiting for approval by the SEC to create the litigation trust to determine if they could
fund the lawsuit before they filed suit. See id. at *16-18.
38. See Mail Boxes Trust, supra note 34, art. 1.
39. Phar-Mor Trust, supra note 37, § 1.5.
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Unlike investor-financed lawsuits4" which allow outsiders (third

parties disinterested in the merits of the litigation) to participate in the
trust, litigation trust agreements only allow insiders to participate in such

a trust.4' The trust agreement may require that, in order to participate

in the trust, the franchisees must sign a consent form adopting the
provisions of the trust agreement.42
The initial source of funding for a franchisee litigation trust comes
from mandatory assessments from the franchisees.43 The amount of the
initial payment is stipulated in the agreement and may be uniform for all
participants."
In addition to defining the participants of the trust (the franchisees),
a litigation trust agreement may also name a trustee or group of trustees,
often called litigation managers, to manage the assets of the trust.45 The
trustee may be authorized to temporarily invest the funds in treasury

bills, money market funds, or other investments, in order to earn interest
that will also be used to finance the litigation.46 The trust may also
require the trustee to establish a budget and make mandatory assessments

on participating franchisees in order to fund on-going litigation.47
Generally, the trustee is to be indemnified against liability to the
trust or to any participant except in cases of willful misconduct or breach

40. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
41. See Pritchard Trust Letter, supranote 37, at *4 (claiming that all investors will be plaintiffs
in the action); Mail Boxes Trust, supranote 34, § 2.02 (allowing only individuals who have invested
in a Mail Boxes Etc. franchise to participate in the agreement).
42. See Mail Boxes Trust, supra note 34, § 2.03 ("The Trustees shall submit to all Participants
a copy of this Trust Indenture and Adoption Agreement to be executed and returned to the Trustees
43. See id. § 3.01 (requiring a mandatory assessment of $500 to participate in the trust);
Pritchard Trust Letter, supra note 37, at *7 (stating that each investor may contribute "up to $10,000
in increments of $1,000" to the fund).
44. See Mail Boxes Trust, supra note 34, § 3.01; cf Pritchard Trust Letter, supra note 37, at
*7.
45. See Mail Boxes Trust, supranote 34, § 3.01; Phar-Mor Trust, supra note 37, § 3.1 (naming
their attorney as litigation manager).
46. See Phar-Mor Trust, supra note 37, § 3.6.4.
All funds received by the Company may be temporarily invested by the P-M Litigation
Manager in United States treasury bills and notes with maturities of 12 months or less,
institutional money market funds, and time deposits and certificates of deposit with
commercial banks organized under the laws of the United States, or any State thereof,
having primary capital of not less than $500,000,000.
Id.
47. See id. § 3.9 (requiring the litigation manager to report no less than annually all resolutions
of litigation claims as well as payments made or received).
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of his/her fiduciary duties.48 Similarly, participants are not liable for the

acts of the trustee or for "losses of the [t]rust assets beyond such
[p]articipant's interest in the [t]rust."49
Litigation trust agreements may be drafted so that the trustee has
sole discretion to determine whether the trust's funds should be allocated
in support of a cause of action raised by a member franchisee."
Although the franchisee who initiated the litigation is the named party to
the lawsuit, a trust should be structured so that any judicial award or
settlement derived from the litigation reverts to the trust for the benefit
of all.51 The trustee may then distribute the award or settlement based
upon the following order of priority: (i) compensatory damages to
reimburse the trust for litigation expenses; (ii) distribution of remaining
compensatory damages to the named plaintiffs; and (iii) reversion of
punitive damages to the trust for the benefit of all participants.5 An
alternative order for distributing the funds is: (i) repayment to the
individual participants in an equivalent amount to their initial investment;
(ii) reimbursement of the trust for litigation expenses; (iii) distribution of
a guaranteed return (often a multiple of the amount invested) to all
participants;53 and (iv) payment of the balance to the named plain-

tiffs. Upon ultimate liquidation of the trust, funds generally will be
distributed to the participants of the trust on a pro55 rata basis, according
to each participant's total investment in the trust.

48. See id. § 3.13.1 (providing that "[tlo the fullest extent permitted by the Delaware Act, the
Company, to the extent of its assets legally available for that purpose, will indemnify and hold
harmless the P-M Litigation Manager ...from and against any and all loss, cost, damage,
expense ... or liability").
49. Mail Boxes Trust, supra note 34, § 6.02; see also Phar-Mor Trust, supra note 37, § 3.13.1.
50. See Mail Boxes Trust, supra note 34, art. 1 (giving the trustee power to determine if the
claims represented by individual members of the trust represent common claims or disputes of the
franchisee members as a whole for the purpose of allocating money to the individuals to fund a
lawsuit against Mail Boxes).
51. See Pritchard Trust Letter, supranote 37, at *8-9; Mail Boxes Trust, supranote 34, § 3.04
("Upon termination of litigation, whether by judgment or settlement, any awards from the court, or
any proceeds from any out-of-court settlements, however received and however designated,
collectively or individually to one or more Participants, shall revert to and be disbursed by the
Trust.").
52. See Mail Boxes Trust, supra note 34, § 3.04.
53. See Pritchard Trust Letter, supra note 37, at *9 (claiming the investors have a right to
receive a five-to-one return on their investment if the litigation is successful).
54. See id.
55. See id. at *8-9.
Monies remaining in the Fund which have not been spent prior to adding the proceeds
from litigation will be distributed to the Contributing Investors on a pro rata basis using
a fraction, the numerator of which is the amount contributed by the Contributing Investor
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2. Benefits of a Litigation Trust Agreement
Collective efforts of franchisees may prove to be a powerful
force.56 By joining their economic resources under a litigation trust
agreement, franchisees can fuel the battle against their franchisor and
litigate common causes of action. In addition to providing financial
support, a litigation trust agreement will unite franchisees and most likely
encourage open communication between them-conceivably revealing
future claims against the franchisor.
C. Investor-FinancedLaWsuit
Unlike litigation trust agreements which are funded solely by
franchisees, "syndicated, or investor-financed, lawsuit[s] [are] financed
by investors who would otherwise have no stake in the case."57 Such an
arrangement often involves plaintiffs selling shares in their lawsuit to
investors in return for a percentage of the proceeds from the litigation. 8
Thus, "[t]he litigant might sell shares prior to litigation or during
litigation as funds are needed."5 9 Investor-financed lawsuits allow
franchisees who have little economic resources of their own to associate
with outside investors in an effort to level the financial staying power of
the franchisor.60
In such a circumstance, the franchisees might sell interests in their
potential recovery from litigation with their franchisors either through a
public stock offering 6' or a "Recovery Participation Agreement" with

and the denominator of which is the total amount contributed by all Contributing
Investors.
Id.; see also Mail Boxes Trust, supra note 34, art. 4.

56. See Emerson, supra note 12, at 1518 ("One of the traditional control mechanisms of a
franchisor has been to keep its franchisees disorganized." (quoting McAlpine v. AAMCO Automatic
Transmission, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1232, 1273 (E.D. Mich. 1978))).
57. Donald L. Abraham, Investor-FinancedLawsuits: A Proposalto Remove Two Barriersto
an Alternative Form of Litigation Financing,43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1297, 1298 (1992).
58. See id. at 1297; Daniel C. Cox, Comment, Lawsuit Syndication:An Investment Opportunity
in Legal Grievances, 35 ST. Louts U. L.J. 153, 153 (1990).
59. Cox, supra note 58, at 153 (footnote omitted).
60. See Susan Lorde Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New Business
Opportunity?, 30 AM. Bus. L.. 485, 508 (1992).

61. See Cox, supra note 58, at 153-56 (describing an inventor who raised four million dollars
for his patent infringement lawsuit by selling, through a public stock offering, interests in his
potentially favorable outcome).
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named investors.62 In either case, if the franchisee wins the litigation,
the investors receive a predetermined percentage of the profits. However,
if the franchisee loses the litigation, the investors lose the amount of
money they invested.63
Alternatively, parties to a lawsuit might raise money from the sale
of shares in their lawsuit and then invest that money, using only the
interest to fund the litigation. 4 Here, if the franchisee wins, the investor
not only would be entitled to the predetermined percentage of the
proceeds, but the initial investment would also be returned to the
investor." Additionally, even if the franchisee loses, the initial investment would be returned to the investor because only the interest would
have been used to fund the litigation.66 Due to the fact that the principal
investment remains in escrow throughout the duration of the litigation
and investors can often redeem their shares at any time,67 this type of
litigation funding arrangement poses little risk to the investor.6"
1. Champerty: Potential Barrier to Investor-Financed Litigation
Despite its apparent benefits, investor-financed litigation faces a
barrier in the common law doctrine of champerty. "Champerty is a kind
of maintenance69 in which the investor receives a share of the proceeds

62. See Killian v. Millard, 279 Cal. Rptr. 877, 878 (Ct. App. 1991) (discussing a plaintiff who
was unable to personally finance his lawsuit and therefore sold 50 "units" at $10,000 per unit with
a 2-unit minimum to specific investors, as opposed to the general public, through a "'Recovery
Participation Agreement"' in return for a "right to a percentage share in the net profits of the
lawsuit").
63. See id. at 878.
64. See Cox, supra note 58, at 155-56 (describing an inventor who attempted to sell 50% of
his interest in his anti-trust lawsuit against a toy manufacturer by selling shares that would provide
the investors with a 25% annual return in the event of a favorable judgment and would return their
initial investment in the event of an unfavorable judgment, because the litigation expenses were only
to be paid from interest earned on the investments and the principal amount would remain
untouched); see also A Scheme to Sell Pieces of an Action, Bus. WK., May 24, 1976, at 35
[hereinafter A Scheme to Sell].
65. See Cox, supra note 58, at 155-56.
66. See id.
67. See A Scheme to Sell, supra note 64, at 36 (describing a syndicate lawsuit in which only
the interest earned from the proceeds of the sale of shares would be used to fund the litigation while
the principal would remain in escrow and investors could "redeem their shares at any time, and the
shares would be subject to recall, with interest accrued to the date of recall").
68. See Cox, supra note 58, at 155-56.
69. Maintenance is a common law doctrine that "generally refers to an arrangement in which
one person agrees to support another in bringing or defending a legal action." Martin, supra note
60, at 485.
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of the lawsuit in exchange for financing the legal action. '' 7° "Because
money is solicited from disinterested parties to fund litigation, syndicated
lawsuits, by definition, constitute champerty."7 ' The primary purpose for
prohibiting champerty is the fear of encouraging meritless litigation
whose only purpose is to harass the defendant and create a financial gain
for the investor, as well as the fear of discouraging reasonable settlements.72
Many commentators argue that the champerty doctrine is out-dated
and the conditions of modem society increasingly justify the support of
litigation by third parties.73 They claim that "[i]n reality, it is highly
unlikely that investors would put up money to support lawsuits that were
not meritorious" for fear of not receiving a reasonable return on their
money.74 But, because a small, yet substantial, number of states
continue to follow the common law doctrine of prohibiting champerty,7"
franchisees must determine if their state is included in that group before
seeking outside investors to finance their lawsuit.

m.

SECURITY BARRIER TO FUNDING DEVICES

Apart from the issues and problems addressed above, a securities
analysis is important for determining the appropriate funding device for
franchisees in financing a lawsuit against their franchisor, because if the
76
chosen device is deemed a "security" under the federal securities acts
then registration requirements imposed on securities by the SEC may
prove to be too burdensome for compliance by the franchisee.77 If the
franchisee employs the funding device without registering with the SEC,

70. Id. at 485.
71. Abraham, supra note 57, at 1303-04; see also Catherine Yang, Psst! Wanna Buy a
Lawsuit?, FORBES, May 19, 1986, at 67 ("'There is no doubt that syndicated litigation is a modemday version of champerty and maintenance."' (quoting attorney Mark Morril)).
72. See Martin, supra note 60, at 509-11.
73. See, e.g., id. at 507; see also Cox, supra note 58, at 160.
74. Martin, supra note 60, at 510.
75. The following states have adopted the common law champerty prohibition: Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Utah, and
Wisconsin. Delaware, Michigan, New York, and West Virginia have adopted champerty in a
modified form. Arizona, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Louisiana, New Jersey, and Texas are among
the states which have not adopted the champerty prohibition doctrine in any form. See id. at 488-89;
Abraham, supra note 57, at 1304.
76. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(I) (1994); Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994).
77. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) ("Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall
be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly... to sell such security ....
").
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then the franchisee may be
and the device is declared to be a security,
78
liability.
civil
or
criminal
to
subject
A.

What Is a Security?

The Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") provides a statutory
"laundry list" 79 of devices which are deemed "securities."80 Although
the statute names specific forms a security may take, the drafters
included terms such as "investment contract" and "in general, any

instrument commonly known as a 'security'

as catch-all phrases to

broaden the scope of the definition. 8' The drafters of the Securities Act
intended for the definition to "embod[y] a flexible rather than a static
principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and
variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of
others on the promise of profits." 2 Although class actions, litigation
trust agreements, and investor-financed litigation are not specifically
named in the statute as securities, they bear a striking resemblance to an
"investment contract" which is listed in the statute.
1. What Is an Investment Contract?
The seminal case determining what constitutes an investment
contract under the Securities Act is SEC v. W J. Howey Co.

78. See id. § 77x ("Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this subchapter,
or the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission under authority thereof ... shall upon
conviction be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.').
79. Shawn Hill Crook, Comment, Mhat Is a Common Enterprise? Horizontal and Vertical
Commonality in an Investment Contract Analysis, 19 CUMB. L. REV. 323, 323 & n.2 (1989).
80. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the definitions of a security in the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 are "virtually identical" and that the
coverage of the acts may be considered the same. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 n.1
(1990) (quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975)). The definition
of a security in the Securities Act of 1933 provides:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, votingtrust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil,
gas, or other mineral rights .... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1).
81. Id.
82. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
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("Howey"). 8 3 The SEC commenced an action against the W. J. Howey

Company for offering for public sale small units of a citrus grove along
with service contracts to develop the grove without issuing a registration
statement. The service contract gave the company exclusivd possession
of the land and the fruit on the land. The oranges from the entire grove
were picked, pooled, and sold, and the profits were distributed among the
investors. The Supreme Court found that the combination of the land sale
contract and the service contract amounted to an "investment contract."'' The Court defined an investment contract as "a contract,
transaction or scheme whereby a person [(a)] invests his money [(b)] in

a common enterprise and [(c)] is led to expect profits solely from the
efforts of the promoter or a third party.""5 Each element of the Howey
test has given rise to a substantial body of interpretive case law.
a. Investment of Money
Despite the Howey test's specific reference to "an investment of

money,"86 it is well established that cash is not the only form of
consideration that will satisfy the first requirement.8 ' Goods and
services are also sufficient consideration. 8 The standard is whether
there is an "exchange of value" in which the investor "'commit[s] his

assets to
the enterprise in such a manner as to subject himself to financial
89
loss."'2

83. Id.
84. Id. at 300.
85. Id. at 298-99.
86. Id. at 299.
87. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 & n.12 (1979)
(finding that while the first prong of the Howey test does not require an investment in cash only, but
also includes goods and services, an exchange of labor in return for a pension plan does not satisfy
the requirement because such labor is for the primary purpose of earning a living and not making
an investment); Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 574-75 (10th
Cir. 1991) (finding that an employee's agreement to surrender a portion of his or her wages in
exchange for an interest in an employee stock ownership plan was an "investment of money" for
purposes of the Howey test because there was an "exchange of value"); Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d
1449, 1471 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that a buyer's commitment of his condominium to a rental pool
constituted an "exchange of value" and therefore satisfied the first prong of the Howey test).
88. But see Peyton v. Morrow Elecs., Inc., 587 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding a marketing
manager's employment contract not to be an investment contract, based on failure to satisfy the first
prong of the Howey test, because the manager's only consideration was his services and there was
absolutely no investment of money involved).
89. Hocking, 885 F.2d at 1471 (quoting Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976)).
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b. Common Enterprise
A common enterprise is a venture "in which the fortunes of the
investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success
of those seeking the investment or of third parties." 90 The Court in
Howey did not explain this prong of the test and federal circuit courts are
divided as to whether a common enterprise is a function of horizontal
commonality,9' where the fortunes of the investors are linked to each
other, or vertical commonality,92 where the fortunes of the investors are
linked to the interests of the promoter. 93
Horizontal commonality requires a pooling of investors' funds,
usually combined with a pro rata distribution of profits. 94 Thus, the
profitability of each individual investor depends on the profitability of the
enterprise as a whole.95
Vertical commonality is established by showing "'that the fortunes
of the investors are linked with those of the promoters.' 96 Courts apply
both strict and broad vertical commonality.97 Strict vertical commonality
"requires that the fortunes of investors be tied to the fortunes of the
promoter."9 8 Unlike horizontal commonality, strict vertical commonality
does not require a distribution of the profits pro rata but often involves
an arrangement to share profits on a percentage basis between the

90. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973).
91. See Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1994).
92. See SEC v. R.G. Reynolds Enters., 952 F.2d 1125, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1991).
93. See id.; Revak, 18 F.3d at 87; see also SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946);
Crook, supra note 79, at 328 n.27, 329 nn.28 & 34, 331 n.43 (listing which courts use vertical
commonality and which courts use horizontal commonality).
94. See Revak, 18 F.3d at 87 (finding the sale of condominiums not to constitute a sale of a
security, because there was no pooling of funds where each condominium owner was responsible

for his or her own rent and expenses and could sustain profits or losses independent of other
investors); see also Stone v. Kirk, 8 F.3d 1079, 1085 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that investors in tax
shelter scheme clearly satisfied the horizontal commonality requirement of the Howey test because
there was a common pool of funds from which all could benefit); Hart v. Pulte Homes Corp., 735
F.2d 1001, 1004 (6th Cir. 1984); Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 682 F.2d
459, 460 (3d Cir. 1982).
95. See Revak, 18 F.3d at 87.
96. R.G. Reynolds Enters., 952 F.2d at 1130 (quoting SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co., 758
F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1985)) (describing a promoter who promised a high rate of return on
investors' money by investing such funds in the stock market for them and retaining a percentage
of the profits).
97. See James D. Gordon III, Common Enterprise and Multiple Investors: A Contractual
Theory for Defining Investment Contracts and Notes, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 635, 663-66.
98. Revak, 18 F.3d at 88.
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investor and the promoter.9 The profits of the investors may, therefore,
vary when vertical commonality exists.' Broad vertical commonality
requires the profits of the investors to be "linked only to the efforts of
the promoter."' 0' A Florida district court has analogized broad vertical
commonality to a wheel, "with the promoter as the hub of the wheel and
the individual investors as the spokes."'0 2 "[A]lthough all the spokes
are connected to the hub, they are in no way linked to each other. If one
spoke breaks, the wheel will continue to turn; if the hub is removed, the
wheel falls apart.""l°3
c.

Expectation of Profits Solely from the Efforts of Others

The third prong of the Howey test requires the investor to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. The
profits can be "in the form of capital appreciation or participation in
earnings resulting from the investment.""' Due to the fact that a strict
interpretation of the word "solely" would result in a "mechanical, unduly
10 5
restrictive view of what is and what is not an investment contract,"
the Ninth Circuit took the view that it is not fatal to the analysis if the
investor participated in the efforts to earn profits so long as "the efforts
made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones,
those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of
the enterprise."'0 6 While the Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted
this liberal approach to the third prong of the Howey test, in United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 7 the Court took notice of the

99. See R.G. Reynolds Enters., 952 F.2d at 1130 (finding that an investment satisfied the
commonality requirement of the Howey test when the promoter's profit was contingent upon the

investors' profit).
100. See Revak, 18 F.3d at 87.

101. Id. at 88.
102. Crook, supra note 79, at 332 (referring to an analogy made by the court in Sunshine
Kitchens v. Alanthus Corp., 403 F. Supp. 719, 722 (S.D. Fla. 1975)).
103. Id.
104. Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 576 (10th Cir. 1991)
(finding profit in the form of dividends and stock appreciation, which resulted solely from the efforts
of managers and employees, to satisfy the third prong of the Howey test).
105. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973).
106. Id. (holding that a get-rich-quick scheme satisfied the third prong of the Howey test even

though the investors' profits were partially dependent on their own selling efforts; the significant
efforts were those of employees of the enterprise).

107. 421 U.S. 837, 852 n.16 (1975).
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Ninth Circuit's interpretation and appellate courts have expressly
followed the approach." 8
B. Is a Class Action a Security?
Class action lawsuits have been employed for over sixty years as an
efficient means of litigating common claims. No one, however, has
questioned whether class actions constitute a "security," particularly in
light of the Howey test. If a class action was considered a security, the
pursuit of such actions would be subject to the regulation of the SEC.
Regulation, particularly in the form of registration requirements,019
might prove burdensome on franchisees and may very well frustrate the
purpose of a class action---to efficiently and economically litigate
common claims.
To determine if a class action is a security, each of the methods of
funding a class action (class representatives financing the lawsuit, both
class representatives and class members financing the lawsuit, and the
attorney financing the suit based upon a contingency arrangement) ll0
should be analyzed. After applying the Howey test to each funding
method conclusions will be drawn regarding whether such methods
violate federal securities laws.
1. Class Representatives Fund the Class Action
In the first example, where the class representative funds the class
action, the first prong of the Howey test is satisfied as there clearly is an
investment of money by the class representative. Due to the fact that the
second prong of the Howey test, commonality, requires the profits of the
investor to be dependent upon the efforts and success of the other
investors or the promoter,' the third prong, expectation of profits,
must be analyzed first to determine if a class action in fact involves a
profit. Do plaintiffs (here the class representatives) actually expect to
profit from the resolution of their own claims or do they merely expect

108. See id. at 852 n.16; SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1982)

(admitting that the Supreme Court in Forman was not willing to make a determination as to whether
the word "solely" should be read literally, the court reasoned that it should not be because of the
Supreme Court's repeated instruction to consider investment schemes in "light of their economic
realities").
109. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
110. See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946); see also supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
111. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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to be compensated for a past loss when they participate in a class action?
Arguably, when an action only seeks compensatory damages there is no
expectation of profits, but when the action pleads punitive damages,
plaintiffs have an expectation to receive more than mere compensation--they expect to receive a profit. The second half of the third prong
("solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party" ' ) is satisfied because, although the class representative is required to fairly and
adequately represent the members of the class," 3 the "essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise" belong
to the class attorney.11 4 Therefore, class actions satisfy the third prong
of the Howey test when the class representative expects profits, in the
form of a potential punitive damage award, from the attorney's efforts.
When a class representative finances the lawsuit, horizontal
commonality is not satisfied as there is no common pooling of funds to
finance the litigation. Nevertheless, both broad and strict vertical
commonality are easily satisfied. Broad vertical commonality is satisfied
because the profits of the investor (the representative) are linked to the
efforts of the promoter (the attorney). If the attorney argues the case
persuasively and recovers punitive damages, arguably the class representative will profit. Similarly, because the class representative only profits
when the attorney profits and vice versa, strict vertical commonality is
satisfied.
While it is rare that a class representative would fund the entire
class action, under certain circumstances (where punitive damages are
plead) such an arrangement may satisfy the Howey test. But, arguably,
because such an investment may not have been made for traditional
investment purposes, a class action suit would most likely not be treated
as a security under present securities laws." 5
2. Class Representative as Well as Class Members Fund the
Class Action
Where the representative, as well as the class members, finance the
lawsuit, the first prong of the Howey test is clearly satisfied. Once again

112. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.

113. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
114. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476,482 (9th Cir. 1973); see also Solovy

et al., supra note 16, at 57 (discussing the role of class counsel as the person who "directs, manages,
and controls, the litigation with little or no input from the 'client' class").
115. See Merrill Lynch Capital Markets Structured Invs. Group, SEC No-Action Letter, May
16, 1989, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, No-Act. File, at *16-17.
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the focus shifts to the third prong to determine if the class members and
class representatives expect a profit from a favorable outcome. As
discussed above, where the plaintiffs plead punitive damages they
arguably expect more than reimbursement for past damages--they expect
profits from the essential managerial efforts of their attorney." 6
Such a funding arrangement satisfies horizontal commonality
because the class members and class representatives pool their funds for
the benefit of all. Strict and broad vertical commonality are also satisfied
because assuming there is a profit, the profits of the investors (the class
members and representative) are intrinsically tied or linked to the profits
and efforts of the promoter (the attorney). If the attorney does not make
efforts to win the lawsuit, the members and representative do not profit.
Additionally, the attorney's profits are tied to the investors' because
either they all win or all lose the potential profits. Therefore, where both
the class representative and the class members fund the litigation, it may
be found to be a security.
3. Attorney Finances the Class Action Through a Contingency
Arrangement
When an attorney invests his services as well as out-of-pocket
expenses to fund the suit through a contingency arrangement, the first
prong of the Howey test is satisfied." 7 Such a class action suit does not
satisfy the horizontal commonality requirement because there is no
pooling of funds-the attorney is the only investor. However, when an
attorney invests his time and expenses through a contingency arrangement, he is both the investor and the promoter of the litigation and his
profits are therefore tied to his profits or efforts, thereby satisfying both
strict and broad vertical commonality.
But, because the attorney is both the investor and the promoter, such
an arrangement fails the third prong of the Howey test. The attorney does
not expect profits solely from the efforts of others, but rather from the
attorney's own efforts (time and expenses).

116. See supra Part III.B.1.
117. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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4. Conclusions Regarding Funding a Class Action Without
Violating Federal Securities Laws
Based upon the above discussion, one could argue that class actions,
in fact, violate the federal securities laws when either the class representative and/or the class members fund the action and punitive damages are
plead. However, because no one has pursued such an approach in the
courts or other academic literature, and it is not a traditional type of
investment," 8 it is unlikely that the SEC will begin regulating class
actions as securities.
C. Is a Litigation Trust Agreement a Security?
While litigation trust agreements appear to be an effective device for
franchisees to pool their money and act collectively to finance litigation
against their franchisor, if they are found to be securities under the
federal securities laws then franchisees may avoid using the trusts
because of the burdensome requirements imposed upon securities. This
problem is exacerbated for those franchisees who have already formed
litigation trusts without complying with the securities laws, as they may
find themselves subject to civil and possibly criminal penalties." 9
Following an analysis similar to that performed on class actions,
litigation trusts satisfy the first prong of the Howey test because they
require an investment of money. Typically, a litigation trust agreement
requires franchisees to make a mandatory payment to the trust as a
20
prerequisite to becoming a participant.
Both horizontal and vertical commonality are satisfied. The
relationship between the franchisees in a litigation trust agreement
amounts to horizontal commonality because the franchisees pool their
funds for the benefit of all participating franchisees and therefore, the
profitability of one is tied to the profitability of all. Additionally, if the
franchisee wins the litigation, the profits are distributed pro rata to all

118. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.

119. See Lokker, supra note 8, at 81; see also Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1994)
("Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this subchapter, or the rules and

regulations promulgated by the Commission ...shall upon conviction be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."); id. § 771 ("Any person who offers or
sells a security in violation of section 77e of this title ... shall be liable to the person purchasing

such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdictione...u).
120. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss1/7

20

Carlucci: Litigation Funding Devices for Franchisees: Are They Securities?
1996]

LITIGATION FUNDING DEVICES

participants following dissolution and liquidation of the trust."'
Strict vertical commonality exists when the trust names specific
investor franchisees as trustees. The trustee franchisees, as well as the
investor franchisees, only gain when the trust is profitable; thus, the
profits of the investor franchisees are tied to the profits of the trustee or
promoter franchisees. But, where an attorney or someone outside of the
franchise relationship is appointed trustee,"z strict vertical commonality
may not be satisfied because the profits or compensation of the trustee
may be predetermined and may have no relation to the profits of the
investors.
Finally, no matter who the trustee is (a franchisee or an attorney),
litigation trust agreements satisfy broad vertical commonality because the
trustee is generally responsible for determining if the trust should fund
a potential litigation by making assessments, budgeting the participants'
contributions, investing the contributions to generate interest, and
allocating the funds for an approved litigation,' all of which affect the
investors' profits.
Lastly, the third prong of the Howey test appears to be satisfied
because the participants of a litigation trust generally enter the agreement
for two reasons: (1) to balance the amount of economic resources
available to the franchisee in order to finance litigation, and (2) to profit
from financing a successful litigation. Franchisees who participate in
litigation trusts expect to make a profit; they expect that upon liquidation
of the trust they will receive a pro rata profit composed of successful
litigation earnings and interest from the trustees' wise investments of
participants' contributions. 24 Although courts no longer require the
profits to come "solely" from the efforts of others,"z litigation trusts
are an example of investors (other than the trustee) not participating in
any aspect of the management of the fund. 126 The participating franchisees expect their profits to come solely from the efforts of the trustees
(the named franchisee(s)) and the litigating attorney. The sole function
27
of the participating franchisees is to fund the trust, not to manage it.1
Although a litigation trust agreement appears to satisfy all prongs

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
See supra note 45.
See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 46, 55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.
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of the Howey test, commentators have disagreed as to whether it should
be classified as a security. In a letter to the editor of the FranchiseLaw
Journal, Robert L. Purvin, Jr.128 defended litigation trusts against
attacks by stating that they are not securities. 29 However, Purvin's
argument, in response to a commentator who argued that such trusts may
qualify as securities, 3 ' does not deny that a litigation trust satisfies all
of the elements of the Howey test but simply argues that there is no
profit in recovering compensatory damages and, therefore, litigation trusts
are not securities. 1 ' While Purvin attempts to attack the "expectations
of profits" requirement of the Howey test, he ignores the interest earned
32
on the contributions as well as profits derived from punitive damages
(which are clearly included in the Mail Boxes Trust which Purvin drafted 33). Additionally, although Purvin argues that a litigation trust
agreement is valid based upon the California State Bar Association's
finding that such a trust is not objectionable,134 the SEC has not found
this type of trust to be so unobjectionable. 3 5 In 1986, an attorney who
established the Pritchard Trust requested that the SEC declare the
litigation trust not a security or, alternatively, provide the plaintiffs with
a no-action letter regarding the trust. 136 The SEC refused to do either.
Instead, the SEC remarked, "[T]his Division is unable to conclude that
the proposed creation of the fund to finance litigation ... would not
involve the offer and sale of a security as that term is defined in the

Securities Act of 1933

.

..

,13'

The question therefore remains as to

whether a litigation trust is a security.
D. Is an Investor-FinancedLawsuit a Security?
An examination of investor-financed lawsuits shows that the first
prong of the Howey test is easily satisfied because such lawsuits require

128. Robert L. Purvin, Jr. is the attorney who drafted the Mail Boxes Trust. See Robert L.
Purvin, Jr., Letter to the Editor, 14 FRANCHISE L.J. 102, 103-04 (1995).
129. See id.
130. See Lokker, supra note 8, at 79-81.
131. See Purvin, supra note 128, at 104.
132. See Mail Boxes Trust, supranote 34, § 3.04 ("Any punitive damages awarded shall revert
in toto to the Trust for the benefit of all Participants, to be distributed as set forth in Article 4
133. See Purvin, supra note 128, at 103.

134. See id.
135. See Pritchard Trust Letter, supra note 37, at *1.

136. See id.
137. Id.
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a commitment of money by third parties not otherwise involved in the
lawsuit. Additionally, the pooling of these investors' funds, by the
franchisee, to finance the litigation fulfills the horizontal commonality
requirement. Investor-financed lawsuits satisfy strict vertical commonality
because the investors' profits are tied to the promoter's (franchisee)
profits as the investors receive a distribution of the profits only if the
franchisee wins the lawsuit and recovers a judgment, or agrees to a
settlement. Similarly, the dependency of the investors' profits on the
franchisees' efforts satisfies broad vertical commonality because the
investors do not profit if the franchisees fail to put forth reasonable
efforts to obtain a judgment or settlement in their favor.
The investor-financed lawsuit satisfies the third prong of the Howey
test because an "expectation of profit" is the sole incentive for outside
investors to contribute funds to a litigation in which they otherwise
would have no interest. The outside investors in a syndicate lawsuit are
silent investors and, therefore, do not have a managerial role in the
success of the lawsuit. They rely solely on the efforts of the franchisee,
named as the party to the lawsuit, and the attorney representing the
franchisee.
As illustrated by the effortless satisfaction of the Howey test, it
would not be surprising for investor-financed lawsuits to be found to
qualify as securities under federal securities laws.
E. Possible Exemptions to the SecuritiesAct
This preliminary analysis of securities laws and litigation funding
devices points to a number of issues that seemingly impede the
desirability of collective action. However, the important forces motivating
these devices indicate that litigants are likely to seek resolution of these
issues or will attempt to seek shelter in the form of securities law
exemptions. For example, franchisees of a national franchise who want
to create a litigation trust which would not be subject to securities
regulation might choose to invite only franchisees from their state to
participate in the agreement so that they may fall under 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a)(11), exempting "[alny security which is a part of an issue
offered and sold only to persons resident within a single State or
Territory."' 3 8 Alternatively, if any of the three litigation funding

138. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1994). It should be noted that this
exemption is difficult to qualify for and to maintain because not only must all investors be residents
of a single state, but the issuer or seller of the security must be "doing business" in that state.
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devices does not require funds in excess of five million dollars, the
39
franchisees may not be required to file a registration statement.1
Finally, a private offering exemption, which is available under § 77d of
the Securities Act of 1933, might provide relief for a litigation funding
device which involves fewer than thirty-five people. 4
IV

CONCLUSION

All in all, it is not clear whether securities regulation issues preclude
the use of litigation funding devices. However, in light of the issues
raised above, potential franchisee litigants should be aware of the
possible encumbrances.
Due to the ease with which an investor-financed lawsuit satisfies the
Howey test, in addition to the well-recognized common law doctrine of
champerty, this litigation device appears to be the least desirable of the
three. Similarly, due to the infrequent use of litigation trust agreements,
especially in the franchise industry, as well as the SEC's current "noaction" position towards them, their future remains undetermined and
franchisees should be cautious in participating in them. Alternatively,
franchisees may seek greater comfort through the use of class action suits
to fund litigation against their franchisor. For over sixty years, plaintiffs
have raised class action suits without fear of regulation by the SEC and
although certain types of class actions (those funded by the class
representative or by both the class representative and class members,
which plead punitive damages) may technically satisfy the Howey test,
it is unlikely that the SEC will declare them to be securities under the
present securities laws because class action suits do not resemble
traditional investment contracts.
Jennifer Carlucci*

Additionally, once the exempted securities are sold, their resale may be restricted for a number of
years. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1995).
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b). Note that the franchisees who rely upon this exemption may still
be required to file an offering circular with the SEC. An offering circular is often less complex and
burdensome than a registration statement.
140. See id. § 77d(2); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505-.506 (1995) (stating that the funding device can
include an unlimited number of accredited investors, as defined by § 230.501, but there must be a

maximum of 35 unaccredited investors to qualify for this exemption).
* The author expresses her gratitude to Professor Robert D. Ellis for his time and invaluable
criticism, to her family for their love and support, and to Jeffrey B. Ferrero for his unending
encouragement.
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